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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the impact of monetary policy on bank lending. There is also a contribution 
to the empirical evidence of the fact that lending expansion was one of the causes of the Great 
Recession.  We develop a dynamic model following the GMM method in two steps using a no-
balanced panel of 36 countries of the OECD and the European Union of the period between 
1961 and 2012. The study focuses on some aggregated bank sector characteristics in different 
countries. We show the existence of a bank sector lending channel. We also conclude that the 
years 2003-2004 provoked a significant loan increase that led to the financial crisis started in 2007. 
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1. Introduction 
Monetary policy influences many economic variables, as the interest rate or the 
exchange rate. Since the revelation of the influence of monetary policy on the real 
economy carried out by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), many studies have 
attempted to distinguish the different channels of monetary transmission. This 
paper focuses on the effects of monetary policy in credit. It is the so called credit 
channel (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). This channel is divided in two sub-
channels: the balance sheet channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; De Bondt, 
2004) and the bank lending channel. Impact of monetary policy in the bank 
lending channel is studied in this paper. According to this channel, shifts in 
monetary policy cause a change in the bank credit. Monetary policy affects bank 
deposits and their access to loans supply (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). An 
expansive monetary policy provokes increasing bank deposits, which expands 
lending supply.  
Many studies have analyzed the effects of monetary policy into lending 
depending of bank-specific characteristics. The main bank-specific characteristics 
used on the literature are: size, liquidity, capitalization, credit risk, securitization 
and bank market power. Smaller banks are more influenced by a tight monetary 
policy (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2006; Altunbas et al., 2009). 
Worse capitalized banks respond more to monetary policy (Kishan and Opiela, 
2006; Altunbas et al., 2009; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Gambacorta, 2005). 
Less liquid banks have more impact of monetary changes (Kashyap and Stein, 
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2000; Ehrmann et al. 2003; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Gambacorta, 2005; 
Altunbas et al., 2009; Matousek and Sarantis, 2009). Higher credit risk banks are 
more affected by monetary contractions (Altunbas et al., 2010; Bogoev, 2010; 
Adelino and Ferreira, 2014; Cantero-Saiz et al.; 2014). Less securitization 
improves monetary policy (Loutskina and Strahan, 2009; Altunbas et al., 2009; 
and Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011). Higher level of bank competition 
(less market power) forces to a higher influence of monetary policy (Adams and 
Amel, 2005, 2011; Gunji et al., 2009; Olivero et al., 2011; Turk-Ariss, 2010; 
Brissimis, Delis and Iosifidi, 2012; Fungáčová and Weill, 2013; Fungáčová, et al., 
2014; Leroy, 2014). Furthermore, Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) demonstrated the 
existence of a bank-lending channel in the housing market. 
There is no doubt the origin of the Great Recession that started in 2007 was the 
monetary excess of the previous years, as Taylor (2009) mentioned. The Great 
Moderation started at the end of the petrol crisis, when Central Banks followed 
the Taylor rule. The terrorist attacks of 2001-09-11 and the crisis of high-
technology enterprises of early 2000s supposed a monetary policy change in 
almost all the world, when Central Banks did not follow Taylor rule until 2006. 
The cause was the prevision of a bank panic that never occurred. This lax 
monetary policy provoked a housing boom and a terrible bust.  
As Fungacova, Solanko and Weill (2014) said, since summer of 2007 the ECB 
has been reacting to the crisis by expanding on the set of conventional and 
unconventional policy tools. These unconventional policies do not use the 
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interest rate as an instrument. In contrast, they use total central bank assets to 
expand monetary policy. In this way, as Keynes (1923) said at the “Tract of 
Monetary Reform”, the target of the Central Banks is the control of the amount 
of money, even more nowadays when the interest rate is so low that its control is 
obstructed. Now, some papers have studied the influence of the crisis on the 
bank lending channel (Beltratti and Stulz, 2009; Altunbas et al., 2009; 
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011; Brei et al., 2013). 
In this paper we introduce a study of the bank lending channel aggregating all the 
banks of the economy in a bank sector. Thus, we show smaller bank sector 
economies and worse capitalized bank sector economies have a higher impact of 
monetary contraction. Furthermore, we follow Keynes (1923) and we analyze 
monetary policy with the money supply growth indicator. With this approach, 
central banks aims to control the money supply as an instrument, not the interest 
rate. The next contribution is the relevance of the previous years of the crisis 
(2003-2004) as years when the loan increased significantly. In these years most of 
the central banks applied a monetary policy which did not follow Taylor rule. 
This fact unchained the Great Recession. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the data and develops the 
econometric model, using a dynamic panel data model estimated by the GMM 
method in two steps. We use a no-balanced panel from 1961 to 2012 for 36 
countries, all the EU (27) and OECD countries with the exceptions of 
Switzerland, Cyprus, Romania and Malta. In section 3 we present the results. The 
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main results are the existence of a bank lending channel, the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy on lending and the fact that the previous years of the crisis 
formed a significant period of lending increase. Section 4 discusses the main 
results, showing empirical evidence of one of the causes of the crisis, the lax 
monetary expansion of 2003-2004 that leads an increase of lending. Finally, in 
section 5 conclusions are provided. 
 
2. Econometric model and data 
The formula (1) is a dynamic equation estimated by the GMM method in two 
steps developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). It 
allows to avoid the endogeneity problems lagging variables. 
The empirical specification is based on Ehrmann et al. (2003). The following 
equation reflects interactions between monetary policy, measured as the money 
supply growth, and a bank sector characteristic: 
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   (1) 
with i = 1, . . . ,N and t = 1, . . . ,T and where T is the number of temporal 
periods, N the number of countries, 
,i tL  the loans, lnloans; ln tM the monetary 
policy indicator, represented by the growth rate of the monetary supply, lnM; 
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, 1i tX   denotes the bank sector characteristics of the country, lagged in order to 
avoid endogeneity and the economy-specific characteristics of the country (Gross 
Domestic Product growth, lngdp; value of the stock exchange, stock; inflation, 
inflation; and investment, investment) are denoted by 
,i tY . Finally, ,i tZ  are the 
temporal dummy variables. 
The presence of a bank lending channel should be reflected in a significant 
coefficient for the interaction of bank sector specific characteristics (size, size; 
liquidity, liquidity; capitalization, capital; and bank market power, lerner) with the 
changes of the money supply controlled by the monetary authority. The 
regression also includes temporal dummies to control possible effects of the 
economic crisis, and four economy-specific characteristics of the country (GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) growth, value of the stock exchange, inflation and 
investment) that allow us to capture cyclical movements and are useful in order 
to control demand effects and to isolate the monetary policy.  
Data are available in World Bank data. Size of the financial sector is measured by 
the ratio of loan supply to GDP, liquidity is the share of liquid bank reserves in 
total bank assets, capitalization is the ratio of bank capital and reserves to total 
bank assets, and the market power is measured by the Lerner index. It compares 
output pricing and marginal costs (that is, markup) in the banking market, as 
defined by World Bank. An increase in the Lerner index indicates a deterioration 
of the competitive conduct of financial intermediaries. 
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Investment is the gross capital growth, obtained by the sum of all the increases of 
fix assets and the net variation of stocks. Inflation is measured as the annual 
variation of the cost of a shopping basket for a customer. The value of the stock 
exchange is the product of the price of the shares and their quantity. The loans 
are the total internal credit provided by the financial sector, the financial 
resources provided to the private sector by financial corporations, and it includes 
the gross credit to the private sectors and the net credit to the central 
government.   
Panel data are used. Concretely, it is used a no-balanced panel of the year 1961 to 
2012 from 36 countries, all the EU (27) and OECD countries with the 
exceptions of Switzerland, Cyprus, Romania and Malta. Table 1 gives some basic 
information about data and variables.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
lngdp 1647 25.24315 1.950987 19.35239 30.41878 
lnM 1269 19.3518 42.15664 -28.62978 829.307 
stock 832 54.8372 46.55807 0.0198936 479.8116 
liquidity 395 7.810793 9.323307 0.2296138 60.94282 
capital 415 7.007952 2.442035 2.7 17.4 
lerner 535 0.1851031 0.1177539 -1.60869 0.503105 
investment 1527 23.59319 5.197639 2.388235 53.31139 
inflation 1518 11.16206 39.33546 -4.479938 1058.374 
Year 2002 1872 0.0192308 0.1373719 0 1 
Year 2003 1872 0.0192308 0.1373719 0 1 
 
Correlations among independent variables used in the model are shown in the 
Table 2. The variables with high correlation have not been included in the 
models and hence, in the matrix.  
Table 2. Correlation matrix of independent variables. 
 
lngdp lnM stock liquidity capital lerner investment inflation 
lngdp 1 
       
lnM -0.2915 1 
      
stock 0.2788 -0.0149 1 
     
liquidity -0.3312 0.1064 -0.3866 1 
    
capital -0.3145 0.3118 -0.3118 0.3541 1 
   
lerner 0.0185 0.0673 -0.0786 0.0089 0.0399 1 
  
investment -0.3173 0.4288 -0.0604 0.2496 0.1576 0.1365 1 
 
inflation -0.2344 0.2602 -0.2246 0.2852 0.3516 0.1201 0.204 1 
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The greatest correlation is the correlation between lnM and investment, with a value 
of 0.4288. This correlation is far from 0.9, so it can be said that there is a lack of 
multicolineality. 
   
3. The results 
The results of the paper are summarized in Table 3, which represents the effects 
of the different variables on the bank lending in the short-term, measured as 
elasticities. The models were estimated following the GMM method in two steps 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The 
model they suggested ensures efficiency and consistency, and it is robust to 
heterocedasticity. Absence of serial correlation of order two and the validation of 
the instruments used are tested with the Arellano and Bond (A-B) and the Sargan 
test respectively. 
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Table 3. Estimated models. 
 
(I) Complete dynamic 
model 
(II) Definitive dynamic 
model 
 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
lnloant-1 0.7843568*** 0.1208543 0.6433371*** 0.0662652 
lngdp 0.264275* 0.1391642 0.422798*** 0.0776223 
lnM 0.0114756 0.0074616 0.0059458*** 0.0017457 
stock 0.0008203* 0.0004192 
  
liquidity -0.001708 0.004776 
  
capital 0.019104 0.0166714   
lerner 0.1884458** 0.0950023 -0.0005684*** 0.0001969 
lnM*liquidity 0.000121 0.000293 
  
lnM*capital -0.0007726 0.0006539 
  
lnM*lerner -0.0205004** 0.0094437 
  
investment 0.0180286*** 0.0038216 0.0183664*** 0.0029271 
inflation 0.001511 0.0038702 
  
Year 2002 -0.0006413 0.0485412 
  
Year 2003 0.1034558* 0.0620477 0.0465357*** 0.0168343 
Year 2004 0.0472981 0.044387 0.0243087* 0.0128966 
Year 2005 0.0400017 0.028887 
  
constant -1.810476** 0.7266073 -2.096259*** 0.5427317 
No observations 307 392 
No instruments 39 30 
Sargan test (2nd step; p-value) 
 
0.1109 
MA (1), MA (2) (p-value) 
  
0.0049 0.9484 
* Significance level of 10%,** significance level of 5%, *** significance level 1%. 
The model (II) is the definitive dynamic robust model estimated. The Sargan and 
A-B tests have been calculated with the indicated model, but without robustness, 
in order to be able to test them. As shown tested the model (II) is not subject to 
serial correlation of order two (using the A-B test) and the instruments are valid 
(using the Sargan test). The differences among the two dynamic model 
estimations are: the model (I) is the complete model, with all the independent 
variables without multicolineality, and the dummies of the years and some 
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interactions between variables. There is a lag of the dependent variable. The 
model (II) is obtained after a process of elimination of the no significant 
independent variables. The same model estimated in static (by fix effects, without 
the lag of the dependent variable) obtains an R squared of 0.9202, hence our 
model is a high explanatory model. 
Table 4 shows the effects of the significant variables of the definitive model (II) 
on the bank lending in the short term and in the long-run, measured as 
elasticities. 
Table 4: Short-run and long-run elasticities of the variables of the model 
(II) 
Variable 
Short-run 
elasticities 
Long-run elasticities 
lngdp 0.422798 1.185427472 
lnM 0.0059458 0.016670643 
lnM*capital -0.0005684 -0.001593662 
investment 0.0183664 0.051495123 
Year 2003 0.0465357 0.130475303 
Year 2004 0.0243087 0.068155953 
constant -2.096259 -5.877423752 
 
Long-run elasticities are calculated as formula 2 points: 
1
1
l
j
j
sl
b



     (2) 
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Where l  is the long-run elasticity, s the short-term elasticity, and the other 
variables are the same as in formula (1). 
 
4.  Discussion of the results 
The definitive dynamic model, model (II) is used to interpret the results. 
Differences on short-term and long-run elasticities in monetary shocks and in the 
years before the financial crisis are shown at Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Short-term and long-run elasticities 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Figure 1 shows the mechanism of expansion of the financial crisis. A positive 
influence of a monetary shock in lending can be observed. As mentioned in the 
introduction, after the 2001-09-11 and the crisis of the early 2000s, there was an 
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expansion of monetary policy in prevision to a bank panic that never occurred. 
This monetary expansion did not follow Taylor rule, which is useful to avoid 
business cycles and crisis. This positive monetary shock of years 2003-2004 
encouraged the bank lending, as we can see on the Figure 1. The lending raise 
provoked a sharp increment of the economic growth over the natural growth, 
more than the expected by the literature. Since that, a vicious circle was 
generated: as we can see, economic growth encouraged lending too. It is 
commented that the rise of lending (and then, the expansion of real estate and 
complex funds) was the most important cause of the world financial crisis. And 
we show in this paper that the monetary shocks of 2003-2004 were a first step in 
the perverse chain. 
4.1. Impact of the monetary policy on lending 
A 1 percent increase in the money growth leads to a loan increment of around 
0.0059 percent in the short-term and a lending increment of around 0.0167 
percent in the long-run. It proves the no-neutrality of monetary policy to lending 
in the long-run and in the short-term, too. This effect is significant, so we can 
state monetary policy affects lending, answering the title question of the paper. 
We also prove the existence of a bank lending channel, being significant the 
interaction of monetary policy with capitalization, as we can see in the model (II). 
And the signs of the effects are those expected. The effects of a monetary 
tightening are smaller for banks with higher capital ratios. The theory predict that 
worse capitalized banks are more influenced by a tight monetary policy. This 
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confirms the existence of a bank-sector lending channel in Europe and the 
OECD. We show it can be transformed into aggregated economies terms: worse 
capitalized bank sector economies have a higher impact of monetary contraction. 
This means there is at least one bank sector lending channel in the countries 
studied. So we confirm the bank sector lending channel hypothesis in several 
countries of the world. 
4.2.  Evidence of causes of the financial crisis  
We can see a significant impact of the years previous to the crisis on the bank 
lending. Years 2003-2004 are significant dummies, being 2003 the year with the 
highest coefficient. Year 2003 means an increment of around 0.0465 percent of 
the bank lending in the short-term and a 0.0135 percent of loan increment in the 
long-run. All these facts reflect the monetary expansion of the years before the 
crisis. It forced a development of lending that led to the financial crisis. In this 
paper we suggest empirical evidence that confirms the theory: the expansion of 
lending that caused the current financial crisis was due to a monetary expansion 
in 2002-2005, which did not follow the Taylor rule, in particular the years 2003 
and 2004. All years previous to the period between the petrol crisis (early 1980s) 
and 2002-2005, the years of the Great Moderation, central banks had followed 
Taylor rule, keeping the economy stable. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes how monetary policy measured as money supply growth 
influences bank credit supply. This paper also contrasts whether lax monetary 
expansions of the years before the Great Recession influenced to the raise of 
lending, which caused the crisis as theory predicts.  
After the 2001-09-11 and the crisis of the early 2000s, there was an expansion of 
monetary policy in prevision to a bank panic that never occurred. This monetary 
expansion did not follow Taylor rule, which is useful to avoid business cycles and 
crises. This positive monetary shock of years 2002-2005 encouraged bank 
lending. The lending raise provoked a sharp increase of the economic growth 
over the natural growth, more than the theoretically expected. Since then, a 
vicious circle was generated: economic growth encouraged lending too. It is said 
that the rise of lending (and the expansion of housing funds and its 
corresponding process of financial innovation) was the most important cause of 
the world financial crisis. We demonstrate in this paper that the monetary shocks 
of 2003-2004 contributed significantly as a first step in the perverse chain. 
Using a large sample of countries, we find the significance of the period 2003-
2004 in order to affect bank lending and also of the monetary expansion of that 
period as one of the causes of the Great Recession. We also find the existence of 
a bank sector lending channel via capitalization. We contribute testing the 
presence of this channel with the use of money supply growth as an indicator of 
monetary policy. We also expand the bank-specific characteristics of many banks 
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of a country to bank sector characteristics of different countries. Finally, we 
prove the no-neutrality of monetary policy on credit supply. 
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